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The U.S. Social Economy and the Commons Model of
Production
Roger A. Lohmann
West Virginia University

Abstract
Recent work in Canada and Europe has re-emphasized the place
of nonprofit organizations, as that term is conventionally
understood in the broader context of social economy. Although
not generally recognized by U.S. and international scholars, a
concept of social economy largely compatible with the Canadian
and European formulations is embedded in U.S. constitutional,
corporate, charitable and tax law. However, its full recognition
is discouraged in the current U.S. political culture and third
sector studies. The U.S. social economy provides full and robust,
recognition of the social, political and economic organizations
known as commons, as well as nonprofit firms.

Introduction
There is a tendency in recent third sector conceptual and theoretical
studies to juxtapose the U.S. model of national nonprofit sectors grounded, as
the name implies, in a distinction from market economics. What has been
proposed to take its place is a series of qualitatively different and distinct
approaches. Beginning in the late 1980’s scholars in many countries sought
an alternative contrast, not with the markets but with governments,
indicated by the phrase nongovernmental sector. More recently, there have
been a large number of suggestions that nonprofit or nongovernmental
sectors either were another name for, or an essential part of civil society
(Anheier, 2005;). It has even been suggested that the sector notion be
conflated with philanthropy, in the guise of a “philanthropic sector”.
European and Canadian scholars have put forth at least two distinct
models of social economy. (Evers and Laville, 2004; Laville, 2011; Mook,
Quarter, Armstrong & Whitman, 2015; Quarter, Mook and Ryan, 2010).
Within the U.S. such perspectives are always advanced with at least one eye
toward a Tocqueville-based American “exceptionalism”, while elsewhere
(particularly in Europe), alternatives to the nonprofit sector terminology
often appear to appeal to a kind of intellectual resistance to perceived
American social science hegemony. Each is both understandable and
regrettable.

It is suggested here that much of this is largely a scholarly tempest in
a teapot. There is, in fact, a clear, well-rounded and robust model of social
economy embedded in current U.S. law, and that this model is both
recognizably distinct from social economy models of the European union and
Canada. Further, it is suggested that this model incorporates a distinctive
sector of tax-exempt/tax-deductible (so called 501-c-3) nonprofit
organizations. The observation that U.S. law and practice places a strong
emphasis on “non-distribution” of profits should not deflect observers from
noting that the full range of associations, organizations, foundations, mutuals
and cooperatives indicated in the European approach is also present in the
U.S. system and has been for most of the previous century.
There is, however, one important major difference. It is simply
inaccurate to speak of the U.S. system (as opposed to particular
organizations) as having been deliberately created or intentionally
established. It is more accurate to say that it was enabled. It is possible to
read U.S. corporate law and tax policy as not straightforwardly constitutive of
a third sector. There is no single statute, ruling, or degree defining or
decreeing that there will be a third, or nonprofit sector.
Instead, the U.S. approach might better be described as a permissive
approach or enabling policy that allows many different possible approaches to
the sector, without actually endorsing any one. This would include, but is not
limited to, the current social enterprise model with which nonprofit
economists and business school faculty are so enamored. However, U.S. law
and tax policy also allows for construction of something very similar to a
European-style social democratic approach to the third sector.
Conceptually, the U.S. model of social economy is potentially a robust
match for anything found in Europe or Canada, at least in its possibilities.
However, the full range of those possibilities are deeply buried in the arcane
precincts of state corporation law and federal and state tax codes. What is
actually done with the U.S. model of social economy in practice may, in many
times and places appear to be a rather paltry production emphasizing
extension of local government and rule-based bureaucracy. This is due far
more to lack of imagination, community support or access to resources than it
is any deficiencies in law or policy.

Conceptual Redundancy?
To some extent, this paper may appear to be an exercise in conceptual
redundancy. Particularly for those most interested in measurement and
hypothesis testing, terms like third sector, nonprofit sector, nongovernmental
sector, civil society, social economy, third nation, third space and commons
may all appear to be labels for the same broad reality “out there somewhere”
in proximity to government tax systems and markets. For these

investigators, the principal issue of the third sector may seem to be only
which one of these terms best characterizes the well-known and homogenous
reality. There is no question of the reality itself, or of its fundamental unity;
only of what to call it. I heard a great deal of such comments in reaction to
the publication of my book, The Commons, for example, which had the
misfortune to arrive just prior to the publication of Robert Putnam’s Bowling
Alone view of civil society (Lohmann, 1992; Putnam, 2000). My perspective
has always been that users of these different labels are actually talking about
different – although partially overlapping – realities. I want to take up that
point again here with particular reference to three of these terms: nonprofit
sector, social economy and commons.

Nonprofit Sector
For purposes of this paper, nonprofit sector is the least complicated to
deal with. First of all, despite a great deal of other casual use, the term sector
is one that properly belongs primarily in an economic context: Sector is a
term referring to groups of related industries or firms producing similar
products, (the insurance sector) or using similar technologies (the high-tech
sector) or similar inputs (the service sector). Leaving aside conceptions of the
organizations or corporations that populate it, the U.S. nonprofit sector is
most commonly said to be the aggregate of 501(c)(3) tax exempt/tax
deductible entities. Technically speaking, this is not a sector in the
recognizable sense since there is no single defining product, technology or
inputs. The nonprofit sector is, rather, an amorphous, legally defined
category of entities doing a wide variety of things with only one thing in
common: legal restraints on their handling of financial surpluses.
Although it may appear a small matter, by definition, under U.S. law
these entities are corporations, and not organizations in any ordinary
sociological meaning of that term. The only organization one can reliably
expect to find in all nonprofit organizations is the mandated and formally
organized group usually termed “the board” – a group of persons with legal
responsibility to “manage the affairs of the corporation.” Whether U.S.
nonprofit corporations include any kind of formal organization beyond the
mandated board of directors is an empirical issue, governed by the
employment contracts of particular corporations.
Sector is a hierarchical, modular notion: there may be sectors within
sectors within sectors. The retail sales sector, the banking sector, and the
local government sector, for example, are all part of the more general service
sector, which may be spread across public and private sectors. In the same
vein, the NTEE classification system allows us to see the health-related
nonprofits, museums and foundations sectors as components of the nonprofit
sector, which I intend to argue, is part of a larger social economy. One key

question that has gone largely unnoticed in discussions of the nonprofit sector
is: What, exactly, is this nonprofit sector a sector of?

Commons
I stepped into this conceptual imbroglio roughly 20 years ago with an
ARNOVA paper introducing the concept of the commons as a way to describe
and explain voluntary action. (Lohmann, 1989) By bringing together Garrett
Hardin’s (1965) metaphor of “the tragedy of the commons” and M.I. Finlay’s
(1974) five-point conception of koinonia politike, my primary intent was (and
remains) to conceptualize a “sector” of voluntary, membership and informal
associations, volunteer, self-help and mutual aid behavior, religious,
professional and grassroots organizations, social movements and other
similar efforts. By sector I meant to denote only a category or class of social
phenomena, not an empirical network of corporations; I tried to signal this
fairly carefully through considerable attention to the fact that the commons
was a Weberian “ideal type.”
A number of people appear to have concluded that I was merely
attempting to re-label what had already been denoted as the nonprofit sector
by substituting the term commons, and to apply that congeries directly to an
empirical reality they perceive (which I do not). I have no disagreement with
the empirical observation that huge numbers of ‘nonprofit organizations’
(actually, corporations) arose in the U.S. in the past half century. I believe
along with others that they did so largely in response to incentives and
unintended consequence of public policy. Some may disagree slightly with my
labeling of these nonprofits, as they have been conceptualized by Salamon
(2003) as ‘nonprofit firms’. Regardless of labels, there is widespread
agreement that such nonprofit entities currently account for a small fraction
of total employment in the post-industrial democracies – typically under 10
percent. By contrast, if my reading is correct semblances of the voluntary
action of the commons have existed for thousands of years and in hundreds of
separate cultures, are spread across entire cultures and may, in part, be
hard-wired into the human genetic code.
Alas, the title metaphor I used in a 1989 article – titled And Lettuce is
Nonanimal – raising some of these classification issues achieved considerably
more notoriety than the concept of the commons it was intended to
illuminate, although this may have been redressed to some extent by my
1992 book, The Commons: New Perspectives on Nonprofit Organizations,
Voluntary Action and Philanthropy, which I am currently revising (Also, see
Lohmann, 2015). As recent literature attests, the underlying issues of
definition and classification have not yet been satisfactorily resolved.

Social Economy Defined
The proximity of the idea of a social economy to some very familiar
third sector concerns is easy to see: Westlund, for example, stated "(a social
economy is) democratically driven economic activities which neither are
carried on within the public sector nor have economic profit as the main
purpose of activity" (Westlund, et. al., 1996: 6). Similarly, the government of
Sweden (1998) declared that "The social economy consists of organized
activities that primarily have a social purpose and is organizationally freestanding from the public sector." The European Union, perhaps attuned to
differences in language, political culture and other nuances has tended to
deal with the social economy as an amalgam of four types of entities:
cooperatives, mutuals, associations and foundations (CMAF). Quarter, Mook
and Richmond (2003) restrict their definition to Canadian nonprofits and
cooperatives. Evers and Laville (2004) embrace the European Union’s
acronym and explicitly set it off against what they present as the U.S. based
‘nonprofit sector’.
The idea of social economy has also tended to point up some explicitly
normative directions consistent with its widespread social democratic origins:
According to Trädgardh, a social economy is "the social organization of
production and distribution to achieve the highest possible sum of common
well-being/welfare" (Trädgardh, 2007). The mission statement of the
Association for Social Economy, founded in Washington DC in 1941, speaks of
economic concern for human dignity, ethics and philosophy. Definitions such
as these clearly point to the qualities of “thirdness” outside the state and the
market we have all become accustomed to. That this idea is also closely
related to distinct purposes and missions frequently encountered in the third
sector is clear.

The Argument in Brief
I wish to assert three general premises in the remainder of this paper:
1) The legal basis for organization of a distinct U.S. social economy
that is fully comparable to Canadian and European versions is to be
found widely scattered across state incorporation statutes, federal and
state tax statutes, charitable and constitutional law.
2) The U.S. nonprofit sector of 501(c)(3) tax-exempt/tax-deductible
nonprofit corporations is one component of the larger U.S. social
economy, along with several dozen other types of cooperatives, mutual
benefit entities, associations and foundations.
3) The cross-cultural concept of the commons is well represented in the
U.S. social economy, both within the nonprofit sector and beyond.

The U.S. Social Economy?
Recently, a group of European third sector scholars – a scholarly
commons operating as the EMES Network – have raised a number of
concerns with the U.S. approach to defining and measuring national
nonprofit sectors. (Evers & Laville, 2004) A particular target of criticism by
them is the universality of the U.S.-based “nondistribution constraint” as a
key or defining characteristic of nonprofit corporations in the U.S. (Evers &
Laville, 2004) The EMES approach is, in many respects a political economic
one with overriding macro-economic concerns that seeks to utilize the French
concept of économie sociale and European social democratic perspectives on
cooperation, solidarity and social justice in defining European third sectors. A
principal motive for this project is to advance the argument that the social
economy, not only as an economic configuration, but also as a socio-political
one, offers a preferable conceptualization of the macro-economic, political and
social configuration of third sector activity in Europe.
There is no need to offer any detailed critique of the Evers-Laville
EMES perspective on Europe at this point.1 Although Evers has consistently
focused attention on Lester Salamon and the Johns Hopkins effort, it need
hardly be noted that none of the concepts of nonprofit organization, nonprofit
sector and non-distribution constraint with which he takes great issue
originated with or is unique to the Johns Hopkins initiative.
Adelbert Evers began an essay in the Spring, 2005 issue of the
Democracy and Society newsletter from the Georgetown University Center
for Democracy and the Third Sector by stating "European scholars who are
engaged in third sector research have noted that among their American
colleagues the labels 'social economy' and 'social enterprise' have generated
interest and attempts for interpretation, but also a number of questions." I
confess to being among those who has both interest and questions and this
paper is an effort to deal with both. In general, however, there is probably
greater current interest in the latter than in the former among U.S. scholars.
A number of U.S. based scholars of ‘the third sector’ would concur with
Evers that the “nonprofit sector” concept grounded principally in the nondistribution constraint is almost certainly a culturally specific one not easily
applied outside the U.S.2 U.S. based critics might even go beyond the EMES
In fact, I am largely sympathetic to several aspects of the EMES perspective and critique. As a
doctoral student in social policy planning at the Heller School at Brandeis University, I was part of
the movement to apply European social democratic perspectives on social policy to the American
context, and I have taught coursework in that area for many years. A full-blown critique of the
implications of the EMES thesis from the U.S. perspective is well beyond the scope of this
chapter and would require a volume in and of itself.
2 It can, of course, be applied in other nations, if by that one means that data can be collected, as
the Johns-Hopkins Comparative project has abundantly shown. The essence of the matter
however is establishing the reliability and validity of the resulting data and interpreting their real or
1

perspective to note the important role of methodological individualism – and
peculiar constructs like the conception of corporations as ‘legal personalities’
that result. A point that seems to have eluded any number of third sector
scholars is that U.S. nonprofit corporations are, by definition, not
organizations, but fictive individuals – ‘legal personalities’.
Closer examination will show clearly that there is in federal and state
law a distinct U.S. social economy and that it consists of an elaborate and
highly complex set of legally recognized individual rights and privileges as
well as social collectivities enabled through a system of constitutionally
protected rights3, tax policies dismissing tax liabilities for some types of
earnings and assets4, entitlements granting tax credits to certain persons and
corporate tax payers5, and explicit grants of conditional rights to socially
constructed corporations, foundations and trusts whose social contracts
detailing intended purposes and promised behavior6 earn them combinations
of tax exemption and credit.

A Distinctive U.S. Social Economy Model
Some of the entities in the U.S. social economy are tax-exempt (that is,
not subject to taxation under the terms of U.S. income tax) while others are
not. Much the same can be said for such entities as vehicles of tax-deductible
contributions.
A subset of nonprofit organizations are both tax-exempt and taxdeductible. Contributions to corporations recognized under Sections 501[c]1
(Congressionally-created Nonprofits); 501[c]3 (Public Charities); 501[c]4
(Social Welfare Organizations); and portions of 501[c]8 (Business leagues, if
used for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, educational or other exempt
purposes) and 501[c]13 Cemetery companies may also be deducted as
charitable contributions, for example. In the latter case, the IRS website
full meaning and theoretical significance. The Johns-Hopkins have been invaluable in calling the
attention of the outside world to the existence and scope of assorted national third sectors. (This
is no minor accomplishment in itself!) Yet, they almost certainly seriously understate the scale of
real third sector economic activity in the U.S., and elsewhere, as the very next sentence in the
text notes.
3 The first amendment to the constitution details those rights as prohibiting “established” (stateestablished) religions, the free exercise of religious practice, state-imposed (or other) restrictions
on free expression, assembly and allowing the right to petition the state for ”redress of
grievances.” The Supreme Court has read into this explicit language the famous “penumbra of
rights” including privacy and freedom of association.
4 The best known, but certainly not the only, such dismissal is the exemption for “charitable
purposes” granted under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRS Code.
5 There is, currently, insufficient distinction between the “tax-exemption” and “tax deduction”
provisions to fully appreciate the extent of the U.S. social economy. Many exemption of
6 Social contracts here refer to the intended missions to pursue socially desirable ends and
promised behavior not to distribute profits entitle them to varying combinations

advises “Donations to exempt cemetery companies, corporations chartered
solely for human burial purposes, and perpetual care funds (operated in
connection with such exempt organizations) are deductible as charitable
contributions on the donor's federal income tax return.”
Other organizations, including those qualifying under 501[c]2, 501[c]57, 501[c]9-23 and 501[d-k and 527, as well as 501[c]8 contributions not
devoted to public charitable purposes, may be exempt from federal taxation
but not deductible by donors. It is important to note here that some
categories of nonprofit organization (for example, 501[c]20, Group Legal
Services Plan Organizations, may qualify for exemption from federal taxation
only if they meet specific IRS requirements. It is important to note also that
not all entities falling within the social economy categories identified by the
tax code are tax-exempt: For example, “The exempt purposes of a labor or
agricultural organization (501[c]5) does not include direct or indirect
participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in
opposition to any candidate for public office.”

The U.S. Nonprofit Sector
One might add that seeing a nonprofit sector bounded by the
nondistribution constraint as occupying the entire space outside market,
state and household offers a partial, and highly misleading, reading of the
U.S. situation as well, by committing the logical fallacy of substituting the
part for the whole. That larger whole is, as examination of the context of
Section 501 of the IRS code reveals, the social economy. (See Table I) The fact
that the U.S. nonprofit sector has grown rapidly and assumed a greater
economic importance than previously is not disputed. The fact that it is the
only one of the sixty or so legal possibilities in the tax code of any economic
consequence is easily disproved.
There can be no doubt that an important U.S. nonprofit sector is
indeed constituted by approximately 1.5 million tax-exempt, tax-deductible
(501-c-3 and 501c-4) corporations large enough to be required to report on the
IRS-990, together with the similar but smaller corporations and a seemingly
random assortment of religious organizations not required to report because
of insufficient income or first amendment considerations. To this can be
added another identifiably distinct, but overlapping, nonprofit sector of
roughly 80,000 foundations. Are they the same, because at least some of them
are classified as 501(c)(3)’s or are they different because of recognizably
different missions? These questions have yet to be convincingly resolved.
With the part-is-the-whole conception of the nonprofit sector as third sector,
they can’t even coherently be asked. The nonprofit sector concept tends to
treat them identically while the social economy distinguishes them.

The Evers-Laville socio-political perspective, with its emphasis on
social justice, solidarity, equality and other products of European social
democratic thought is not so straightforwardly applicable to the American
social economy.7 Certainly, there are elements and vestiges of the social
democratic “socio-political” view in the American social service system, labor
movement, assorted civil rights movements and elsewhere. As often as not,
these were not native (or nativist!) products but arrived in the minds and
social relations of generations of European immigrants. This observation
offers part of the answer to the puzzle represented by the “off the books”
character of the U.S. Social economy. The European social democratic view
has never been the preferred vision of American political elites and is not so
today. However, that does not mean that there is not full accommodation of it
as a system of minority perspectives.
Regardless of whether Congress or state legislators would concur, the
leaders of many U.S. cooperatives, nonprofits, membership associations,
foundations and mutuals would heartily agree with Regeringkansliet (2000,
quoted in Pestoff, 2004) that, "The concept Social Economy refers to
organized activities which primarily aim at serving the community, are being
built on democratic values, and are organizationally independent of the
public sector. These social and economic activities are run mainly by
associations, cooperatives, foundations and similar groups. The main driving
force of the Social Economy is the benefit of the public or the members of a
particular association, and not the profit motive"
Unlike the European approach, U.S. legal perspectives on the social
economy as third sector are entirely enabling rather than constitutive; they
are not, in any fundamental sense, formative of the third sector as a vehicle
of law or public policy, except as permissible possibilities. The structure one
can see of cooperatives and mutuals in particular is not a planned, intended
or deliberate one; it is largely the result of the accumulation of details and
fine points in tax policy intersecting with corporate law and constitutional
traditions. It is clear, for example, that Congress intended to privilege some
purposes and activities by granting “charitable” tax exemptions and tax
credits, and privilege others by offering a broad range of tax exemptions
without accompanying credits for donations to those same organizations. It is
also clear that some states have been more permissive of cooperatives and
mutual benefit entities than others.

The issues involved are too complex to sort out here and involve the quite different European
and U.S. approaches to the state on a trail laid out by Adam Smith, Rousseau, John Stuart Mill,
Karl Max, Max Weber, Thomas Hill Greene, Bernard Bosanquet, John Dewey, and many, many
others. The overriding point here, however, is that theorizing an independent third sector truly
outside government and the market need not take either as its theoretical point of origin. See
Vincent and Plant, 1984 and Plant, Lesser, et. al, 1980 for an introduction to some of the issues
involved from a British standpoint.
7

It is not clear in any respect, however, that any legislative body in the
history of the U.S. ever set out to create either a nonprofit sector,” or a social
economy”. This observation is critical to understanding one of the principal
characteristics of the U.S. social economy: While social scientists and
nonprofit managers may see tax exemption, tax-deductibility and nondistribution constraints in terms of sectors and broader public purposes, it is
highly probable that in law and public policy these may be simply matters of
tax revenues. In the wake of the famous UBIT case, for example, C.F. Mueller
v. Commisioner. 14 T.C. 922 (1950), which was later overturned on appeal,
Congress amended the IRS Code to include the UBIT (Unrelated Business
Income Test), not as a matter of structure or principle. One congressman at
the time complained that without reform, "[e]ventually all the noodles
produced in this country will be produced by corporations held or created by
universities . . . and there will be no revenue to the Federal Treasury from
this industry." (quoted in http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/
template.cfm?PubID=7267; 9/24/06) There is no recorded intent to create or
amend either a nonprofit sector or a social economy by this amendment to the
tax code.
The “nonprofit sector” and the “social economy” in the U.S. are both
profitably seen as unintended consequences; latent functions of a system
designed primarily to allocate liabilities and risks and assure equitable
collection of federal taxes. Tocqueville’s chapters in Democracy in America,
and the Filer Commission, hold no constitutional or legislative powers. These
social observers merely spotted trends evident in U.S. community life; they
did not enact these sectors (nor did anyone else). There is no documentary
record to support the conclusion that the Founding Fathers, Congress, state
legislatures, the Supreme Court, the executive branch at any level of
government or anyone else ever intended to bring into being a realm, sphere,
sector or domain quite like the third sector. It happened because of the
uncoordinated actions of other social actors, and legislative bodies merely
responded, primarily to protect the interests of the state.
Both of these sector constructs can only be inferred from the actual
patterns and regularities derived from empirical observation.8 We can begin
that observation with the nearly 60 distinct types of organizations mentioned
in section 501 of the U.S. tax code. One can find in Table I multiple examples
of the full range of the Canadian and European conceptions of social
economy: cooperatives, tax-exempt/deductible nonprofits, other associations,
mutuals of several types, and foundations. In Table 1, I have made a
preliminary classification of the tax-code categories as social economic
sectors, based on examination of the IRS descriptions.
The same, of course, is true for most macro-economic constructs. One also cannot directly
observe “the transportation industry”; it must be inferred from date on the performance of firms in
transportation services.
8

Based on this, it appears that there is a distinct U.S. social economy
imbedded in U.S. tax law, and that the nonprofit sector, however narrowly or
broadly defined is part of it. It should also be clear, in context, that the
concept remains viable whether a social economy is deemed to mean a cluster
of nonprofits and cooperatives, as in the Canadian approach, or cooperatives,
mutuals, associations and foundations in the EMES approach, fairly clear
nonprofit (501(c)(3) sector is there alongside a profit-sharing sector
(cooperatives, credit unions, and others) just as the EMES folks suggest.
Furthermore, it is relatively easy to discern a grassroots, community-based
sector in Sections 501(c)(4,6,7,8,12) and elsewhere even though those explicit
terms are not used.9

Commons Updated
In the right-hand column of Table 1, I have also sought a preliminary
classification of some of the identified social economy organizations most
likely to contain members that meet the criteria of commons. Members of the
class, category or sector of commons can be seen as productive economic units
possessing five principal characteristics: Three of these characteristics are
constitutive, or constitutional (that is, necessary for the formation of
commons): volunteer labor10 (or social action), shared purposes, and pooled
resources. Once a commons begins to act (defined in an economic sense as
contract, choice and communication) to achieve one or more common purposes
using pooled or shared resources, we have a basis for not only social and
political, but also economic action, even though commons are not the
conventional economic figures portrayed in microeconomic theory of the firm.
The final two terms in the definition of a commons can be fashioned as
‘outputs’ or products of such action – common goods, in the language of the
theoretical model: As engines of economic production commons will, I assert,
produce social capital characterized by philia, or a sense of fellow-feeling or
mutuality, but also characterized by increases in trust, mutual respect,
reputation, and social networks for sharing of information and influence.
Further, the volunteer labor, shared mission and pooled resources of a
commons will also over time produce and reproduce spontaneous moral order
– the group norms, folkways and mores that sociologists and anthropologists

I had thought of including 501(c)(13) cemetery companies in this list of “grassroots”
organizations, but feared readers might see it as an attempted joke in rather poor taste.
10 Actually, “action” in Hannah Arendt’s terminology, labor being effort to sustain survival. I use
the more conventional term labor here because of its widespread contemporary connotation of
human effort – with little conscious connection to the broader issue of survival. A principal
assumption of commons theory is that participants in a commons must be ‘affluent’ in the sense
of their survival not being currently threatened in order to be admitted to a commons. Those who
are starving, or whose lives are threatened by political repression are not suitable candidates for
voluntary association in the ordinary sense.
9

have traditionally focused on, but seldom treated explicitly as active products
of group action.
The commons as I see it is politically or civically an element of civil
society as portrayed by Van Til (2007) – a part of the “third space”
distinguishable from formal government, the market economy and the
“intimate space” of the household. Indeed, using Cohen and Arato’s (2000)
approach to civil society – which also makes reference to communication
media, one might see the commons as a domain of voluntary action –
associations and social movements.

Some Preliminary Observations
The first point I wish to make involves an issue of basic social theory:
although the conception of a “third sector” as a social, political and economic
space apart from the market economy and political state holds up well under
close examination, efforts to identify such a sector exclusively as a “nonprofit
sector” of 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charitable corporations simply does not
withstand close examination. (Evers and Laville, 2004) Conceptualizations of
the “third sector” continue to suffer from a fundamental theoretical confusion:
On the one hand like markets and states the third, or nonprofit, or voluntary
or nongovernmental or philanthropic sector is said to be a general, perhaps
even universal, social category distributed across many nations, societies,
languages and cultures. On the other hand, it is suggested that this same
general category is thickly embedded in the unique historical, linguistic,
cultural and institutional matrices of particular nation states, including the
U.S.
In the U.S., over and beyond the problem of large numbers of
charitable corporations not required to file IRS-990s for economic,
constitutional and other reasons, there is the even more difficult problem of
an ambiguous class of religious, membership, voluntary and other
associations and groups. In addition, there are problems such as how to
account for political parties and interest groups, labor unions, social
movement organizations and a broad range of other exceptions. While
labeling categories of these as fourth (or fifth, and sixth) sectors may appear
to dispose of the problem, it does not really offer a solution. Given the
tendency to define the third sector as the space outside markets and the
state, it appears to consign entire realms of public and private action in civil
society to irrelevance and even non-existence. We need a better way.
The second point I would like to make is that when I look over the vast
range of diverse and complex formulations offered in third sector studies over
the past two decades, nothing strikes me as quite so plausible as that a
meaningful, robust and genuinely interdisciplinary “third space” between
market and state can be conceived as a shared space, or common field of the

political and civil perspectives of the civil society construct and the economic
perspectives of the social economy (economie sociale).
We might even project a preliminary civil-economic “division of labor”
between the two perspectives, using Lionel Robbins’ famous definition of
economics as "the science which studies human behavior as a relationship
between given ends and scarce means which have alternative uses."
Beginning with the common denominator of rational choice, we might argue
that those ends and the range of alternative uses are the domain of civil
society beyond the authoritative decision-making of the state. At the same
time, it is the particular domain of social economy to enable rational meansend choices where rigorous market conditions do not apply – whether it is the
absence of price mechanisms and profit-motives, the absence of large
numbers of buyers and sellers, or other missing conditions. In this respect,
various national third sectors are both non-market and “nongovernmental in
character, and to varying degrees. Interestingly, this approach, if played out
fully would appear to allow for both public and private nonprofit
organizations, the exercise of compulsory legal and voluntary ethical nondistribution constraints, alongside various forms of and for both market and
non-market participation as well as a variety of combinations of profitdistribution by cooperatives, and various other social enterprises.
In my rendering, the commons was not intended to apply solely to
nonprofit ‘organizations’ as dings an sich with an organization chart, fixed
address, stationery and a paid staff. Committees, groups, gangs, entourages,
membership associations and those involved in administering charitable
trusts, as well as groupuscules11, mutual aid networks, pilgrimages,
festivals, computer networks and general social networks all possess
characteristics of commons in this sense.
The hypothesis may be too much for some to accept that there are
consistent threads – including economic ones – describing and explaining the
voluntary association of a fire brigade, the spontaneous order of a ‘gang of
hooligans’ or peer group who for their own religious, class, political, or social
reasons organize, prepare, ignite and gather round the very bonfire the
firemen seek to contain or extinguish. For them, it will be even more of a
stretch to extend these threads to the committee of local civic leaders who
years, decades or centuries later seek to turn such routine but conflict-laden
community events into a civic festival. Perhaps we can at least agree,
however, that association in these assorted instances refers explicitly to both
certain social objects (primarily groups cliques, clubs, bands, gangs, and the
The term is most typically used to refer to small political factions on the extreme right and left
that are constantly forming, reforming and attracting members who then quickly move on to other,
later factions. Such dynamic “structures” characterized by short term association memberships in
rapid succession are common also in high school and college peer groups and other settings. In
larger historical terms, the entire national third sector in the U.S. is a kind of groupuscule.
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like) and to the social processes of constituting them; and that, therefore, a
strictly structural and cross-sectional approach is not sufficient.
It is when one further considers the vast mélange of associations as
distinct economic units capable of producing recognizable (if, usually
unmeasured) economic output along with their expressions of human
sociality that the full range of the commons begins to come into clearer focus.
Alongside other aspects of personal and social behavior, there is economic
production to be found in the social psychological and group processes of
voluntary action. This, even though the economic impact of the more
structured and recognizable formal nonprofit organizations such as hospitals,
clinics, colleges, and social service agencies may be easier to identify and
measure.

Conclusion
Through close examination of laws, institutions, court rulings, one can
see that the U.S. social economy is a distinctive cluster of partly measured
and partly unmeasured producers of economic output in religion, charity,
philanthropy, science, arts and assorted other, related activities. This social
economy consists of an odd assortment of measured, unmeasured, mismeasured and un-measurable components.12 It also consists of public
(governmental) support, to private (commercial, market or for-profit), and
nonprofit firms and commons.
To continue to focus on the nonprofit sector exclusively solely because
the data yielded by the IRS-990 tax returns enable us to do so puts us
roughly in the position of the drunk who lost his keys “over there somewhere”
but is looking for them under the streetlight “because the light is better
here.”
It can be seen also from this analysis that the contrast articulated by
Evers and Laville, et. al. (2004) that the European third sector represents a
social economy while the U.S. third sector is a nonprofit sector is
fundamentally false because it focuses exclusively on the part of the U.S.
social economy that has interested nonprofit scholars in recent years. Other
major parts of the U.S. social economy (specifically coops) may be more
limited and even vestigial than their European counterparts, but they do
exist.
The important differences between the U.S. Canada, Europe, and other
nations and regions in the scale and scope of various sectors of the social
economy should not deceive us into the false and simplistic conclusion of the
Given the very nature of the activity, for example, religious economic output is largely
unmeasured and may, indeed, be unmeasurable as many have argued. As numerous Austrianschool economists have noted, lack of economic measurement is no reason to exclude religion or
any other activity from conceptualization in the social economy.
12

first subhead of the Evers-Laville Chapter 1: “Nonprofit Sector verses Social
Economy.”
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